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Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy approach that holds 
manufacturers accountable for the full costs of their products at every stage in their life 
cycle. EPR typically involves requiring that producers take back their products at the end 
of their useful lives, or pay a recycling contractor to do so, thereby internalizing the costs 
of recycling or disposal in a manufacturer’s bottom line. When companies know that they 
will bear the costs of product return and recycling, they are more likely to redesign their 
products for easier and safer handling at each step in the life cycle. This approach 
“enforces a design strategy that takes into account the upstream environmental impacts 
inherent in the selection, mining and extraction of materials, the health and environmental 
impacts to workers and surrounding communities during the production process itself, 
and downstream impacts during use, recycling and disposal of the products” (EPR 
Working Group 2003, 2). In short, by requiring a company to take its products back, EPR 
aims to force the company to make the products cleaner in the first place. 
The idea of applying EPR policy to electronics arrived in the United States in the 
1990s as a welcome import from Europe. This chapter traces EPR’s adoption by 
coalitions of U.S. environmental, labor, and health activists seeking a comprehensive 
policy solution to the health and safety threats posed by the high-technology industry’s 
internationalization.  
The European Union Model and the Soul of Globalization 
In the 1990s, American labor, health, and environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) concerned about the electronics’ industry’s impact sought to turn 
the process of economic and political globalization to their advantage. Forming the 
International Campaign for Responsible Technology (ICRT) in the 1990s, NGOs that had 
worked mainly at the local level first built national and then international ties to share 
information and strategies and conduct campaigns across borders (see Byster and Smith, 
“From Grass Roots to Global,”  this volume). They found a promising, comprehensive 
policy solution in EPR, as embodied in the European Union’s (EU) proposed directives 
on electronic waste and toxics reduction (see Geiser and Tickner, this volume). Activists 
recognized that by raising standards for the production and disposal of electronics in 
Europe, the EU directives offered the best tool for raising standards in the United States 
without sweeping its toxic waste under developing countries’ rugs (Smith and Raphael 
2003).   
EPR promised to promote higher environmental and workplace safety benefits 
worldwide, rather than shift risk abroad and fuel a downward spiral in standards. By 
requiring producers to take back their products, redesign them for easier recycling, and 
phase out some of the most dangerous toxics, the EU’s directives sought to reduce risk at 
each stage of a product’s life cycle wherever it occurred in the globalized electronics 
industry. Rather than exerting downward pressure on environmental and labor 
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protections, globalization could be turned into a force that conditioned access to major 
world markets on meeting more stringent norms for design and disposal. In the era of 
global markets, transnational corporations must meet the highest standards set in any 
major market because it is expensive to manufacture different product lines for different 
regional markets. In addition, if companies were to produce more hazardous and less 
hazardous versions of their products for different markets, they would be opening 
themselves up to public and regulatory criticism (as well as potential liability) for 
employing an environmental double standard that poses greater risks to some customers 
and regions. 
The turn to Europe was a response to the new political realities of the 1990s, as 
well as a struggle for the soul of economic and political globalization itself. Many 
criticisms of globalization have focused on how the new international trade regime can 
usurp the power of national governments to maintain strong protections for their workers 
and the environment (e.g., Falk 1999). However, during the years of Republican 
presidential administrations from 1980 to 1992, the path to enacting progressive 
regulations rarely began at the national level. Instead, environmental activists focused on 
building grassroots support for legislation in the most receptive states, pressuring industry 
and government for national reforms to resolve a patchwork of different state rules. 
Because activists were accustomed to seeking the most strategic forum for advancing 
policy rather than fixating on the federal government, they saw that the EU’S formation 
offered a friendlier counterweight to the rise of supranational organizations like the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The route to U.S. reform now might run through 
Brussels, as well as through the state capitals. 
 As a sign of the internationalization of electronics regulation and activism, the 
ICRT’s first step in embracing EPR was to defend Europe’s ability to enact it against the 
U.S. government’s and the industry’s objections. In 1998, the American Electronics 
Association (AEA), a major trade association, convinced the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) and the Mission to the European Union to fight the European directives. The 
trade associations argued that mandated phase-outs of toxic materials would undermine 
the “functionality, safety, and reliability” of their products, and “impede the development 
of new technologies and products, increase costs, and restrict global trade in these 
products” (Hunter and Lopez 1999). The trade associations also alleged that requiring 
producers to assume financial responsibility for collecting and processing e-waste 
violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules against trade 
restraints. The U.S. Mission in Brussels agreed, arguing to the EU that the directives 
raised “unnecessary barriers to trade, particularly the ban on certain materials, 
burdensome take-back requirements for end-of-life equipment, and mandated design 
standards” (quoted in Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition  [SVTC] 1999).   
In response, the ICRT organized efforts to defend the directives from U.S. 
lobbying. After a key meeting in Europe in 1999 between U.S. activists and their allies in 
the European NGO community, the Trans-Atlantic Network for Clean Production was 
formed, with a goal to defend the European directives from U.S. industry attacks. The 
ICRT wrote a legal rejoinder to the industry’s claims, showing how industry had erred in 
arguing that the EU directives were not protected by General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade’s  (GATT) exemptions (Clean Computer Campaign 1999). The ICRT also 
mobilized a coalition of hundreds of labor, environmental, and community organizations 
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expressing support for the EU directives and calling on then Vice President Albert Gore 
to rein in the USTR’s lobbying efforts. Although industry cast the directives as a matter 
of “free trade” versus “protectionism,” activists used the letter to Gore to transform the 
debate into one about corporate responsibility, sovereignty, and democracy (ICRT 1999). 
Later that same year, as part of the major WTO mobilization in Seattle, the ICRT 
organized a protest against e-waste at Microsoft headquarters to further pressure U.S. 
industry to back off in its efforts to undermine the EU directives (see Photo 22.1<Photo 
22.1>). Microsoft was chosen not only because it was a co-host of the WTO meeting, but 
also because its constant software updates push demand for more processing speed and 
drive the pace of computer hardware’s rapid obsolescence and the growth of e-waste. As 
a direct result of this organizing, the USTR attenuated its lobbying in Europe.    
Importing EPR into the United States 
During the years 2000–02, as approval of the EU legislation was increasingly 
imminent, an expanding coalition of NGOs took the lead on introducing EPR into U.S. 
debates. Although local and state governments, electronics recyclers, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and industry began discussing how to build an 
electronics recycling infrastructure and allocate recycling costs, they focused on 
improving practices for dealing with products at the end of their lives. Had NGOS not 
advocated for an EU-style solution, the problem would have been seen simply as one of 
paying for managing e-waste responsibly, rather than as an opportunity to address the 
effects of electronics at each stage of their life cycle.  
NGOs faced the challenge of the need to grow acceptance of producer 
responsibility in arid political soil. In the United States’ historically pro-business 
regulatory context, federal regulators already had imposed a kind of conceptual tariff on 
the idea of producer responsibility as it entered the country. They transformed EPR into 
“Extended Product Responsibility,” a voluntary approach to sharing responsibility for 
products by all actors, including consumers and government (President’s Council on 
Sustainable Development 1997). This excised the notion that producers alone should 
assume responsibility because internalizing the full disposal costs of their products would 
likely force companies to redesign them for the better. The U.S. version of EPR held 
consumers and government partially accountable for decisions about product design that 
they had no power to control. NGOs opposed this definition, arguing that, “if everyone is 
made responsible for everything, no one is responsible for anything” (quoted in Fishbein 
1996). 
In 2001, a broad coalition formed the national Computer TakeBack Campaign 
(CTBC), which became the major voice for adopting producer responsibility policies for 
electronics in the United States (see Wood and Schneider; Appendix D, this volume). The 
CTBC developed a two-pronged strategy that combined a policy campaign aimed at 
fostering EPR legislation and industry agreements, with a market-based campaign, 
designed to build support among consumers and shareholders for producer responsibility 
(see Appendix C, this volume). The policy campaign supported regulatory and legislative 
efforts to enact producer responsibility with high environmental and worker safety 
standards for the recycling industry. The market-based campaign devoted much of its 
attention to pushing personal computer (PC) industry market leader Dell, Inc., to accept 
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EPR, but it also generated support from recyclers for responsible recycling practices and 
recruited institutional buyers to adopt environmental purchasing guidelines that included 
demanding take-back provisions from electronics vendors.  
Recognizing that there ultimately would be a need for nationwide legislation to 
ensure a fair, effective take-back and recycling system, the CTBC took part in national 
negotiations over the outlines of such a system. This began in early 2001 with the 
formation of the National Electronic Products Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), a 
multistakeholder dialog on resolving the e-waste problem, which represented federal 
regulators’ main effort on the issue. NEPSI was funded by the U.S. EPA and coordinated 
by the Center for Clean Products and Clean Technologies at the University of Tennessee. 
NEPSI participants included representatives from major computer and television producers, 
the Electronics Industry Alliance (EIA), state and local governments, recyclers, retailers, 
and environmental advocates. They agreed on a goal of fostering “the development of a 
system, which includes a viable financing mechanism, to maximize the collection, reuse, 
and recycling of used electronics, while considering appropriate incentives to design 
products that facilitate source reduction, reuse and recycling; reduce toxicity; and increase 
recycled content” (NEPSI  2001). Industry representatives initially proffered a financing 
scheme that would have charged consumers who brought back old electronics, which the 
CTBC saw as a disincentive to recycling. The CTBC and its allies eventually succeeded in 
breaking down the industry’s resistance to charging front-end fees on its products that 
would be used to finance the recycling infrastructure (NEPSI  2003).   
During this multiyear process, following the defeat of the industry's "back-end 
financing" scheme, it became clear that the industry participants were split between two 
different "front-end financing" positions. The majority view advocated for a small 
consumer fee on new equipment to pay for recycling, without any additional obligations on 
manufacturers. The television industry and IBM supported this plan, largely because they 
are the major producers of historic waste, for which they would not have borne significant 
financial responsibility. The minority view—supported by Hewlett-Packard (H-P), as well 
as by the environmental NGOs—advocated for producers assuming responsibility for 
taking back and recycling their own obsolete products. After NEPSI disintegrated in 
disagreement over financing schemes in early 2004, the CTBC achieved a key victory by 
persuading Dell to join H-P in endorsing a Statement of Principles in support of Producer 
Responsibility. By organizing around this statement of Principles, the CTBC helped 
solidify the split within the industry by using its campaign against Dell to bring its position 
into alignment with its primary competitor—H-P. For its part, H-P had endorsed cost 
internalization because H-P saw it could give the company a potential competitive 
advantage as an early investor in building a recycling infrastructure for its own products.   
The CTBC’s main policy campaign focused on passing local and state initiatives to 
build momentum for a national solution. State-level stakeholder dialogues involving CTBC 
representatives predated and paralleled NEPSI, offering forums for exchanging information 
and discussing policy options among local solid-waste officials, the industry, and activists. 
This created a groundswell of support for statewide solutions, resulting in a wave of e-
waste bills proposed in twenty-four states by June 2003. Although many of the bills failed 
to incorporate full producer responsibility (Raymond Communications 2002), the 
momentum for legislation built swiftly.  
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By building public awareness, the CTBC forced e-waste issues toward the top of the 
public policy agenda. California was the first state to enact a full-fledged e-waste recycling 
bill in 2003, but due to last minute lobbying from the television industry and IBM, the bill 
dropped full, producer-responsibility mandates in favor of requiring only a small, front-end 
consumer fee to help finance recycling, similar to the existing "bottle bills" that do not 
provide incentives for design change. In 2004, Maine became the first state to enact a true 
producer-responsibility law. Minnesota and Massachusetts were close behind in similar 
efforts with the Minnesota bill coming very close to passage in the 2005 session. It is likely 
that the states will continue to be the focus of legislative action as long as the industry 
remains split and as long as the U.S. Congress remains uninvolved. 
Framing Matters: E-Waste and EPR 
The CTBC’s progress at introducing EPR also depended on its ability to frame its 
position effectively. Scholars frequently have emphasized the power of framing in 
environmental politics (e.g., see Capek 1993; Hannigan 1995; Sandweiss 1998). Frames 
are ways of defining and understanding public issues and events. A frame identifies 
social problems, names their causes, implies a range of solutions, and attributes moral 
responsibility by identifying victims, villains, heroes, and heroines (Entman 1993). For 
example, Americans became increasingly concerned about the environment in the 1960s 
in part because a number of recognized problems not previously thought of as 
connected—such as the destruction of wilderness and species, the human health effects of 
pesticides and industrial chemicals in the workplace and community, and declining air 
and water quality—were reframed as the larger issue of “the environment” (Schoenfeld, 
Meyer, and Griffin, 1979). This reframing of what had been treated as distinct problems 
in policy circles and public discourse drew attention to their larger, common causes: an 
industrialized economy based on unchecked growth and consumption, a view of nature as 
existing solely for human exploitation, and the lack of public accountability on the part of 
the state and corporate developers of technology. This new and overarching 
environmental frame also implied the need for more far-reaching policy solutions, such 
as limiting growth, phasing out toxic materials, and enforcing greater public transparency 
of industry and government. The new environmental frame of the 1960s included a 
sharpened moral vision more willing to attribute ecological destruction to corporate and 
government decision makers. 
This approach helps us to see how the emergence of environmental policy, and 
struggles over it, are also contests over framing. It turns our attention to questions about 
which actors possess the power to define problems in the public arena, how they define 
them strategically, how they use rhetoric to persuade others to accept their frames, and 
why some frames are more successful than others. It shows how our definitions of 
problems often shape the range of reasonable responses to them. 
Environmental sociologist John A. Hannigan (1995) identified five factors that 
help account for whether environmental claims succeed or fail at gaining acceptance 
among the media, policymakers, and the public. We use these factors to examine how the 
CTBC framed its claims about e-waste and the need for a European-style take-back 
system. Framing is especially important in the U.S. context, where the news media play a 
major role in the policy process. As Sigal (1973) noted, the U.S. government, from the 
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municipal to the federal levels, is large, geographically dispersed, and highly 
decentralized, making it difficult for officials to communicate with each other.   
Authority 
Activists’ claims typically must be articulated in part through established 
authorities to gain wide legitimacy. Local and state government representatives have been 
especially important bearers of the message that the costs of handling e-waste are 
prohibitive and that industry must internalize and reduce them. The movement of bills 
through state legislatures provided news pegs for ongoing coverage of the e-waste 
problem. The range of debate in the mainstream American news media is closely 
calibrated to the range of views voiced by political elites at any given time (Bennett 
1990). When political leaders legitimize EPR as a solution, journalists are more likely to 
treat its advocates in NGOs as credible and relevant sources.  
Cultural Consonance 
Successful environmental frames are presented in ways that resonate with existing 
culture and beliefs. A full-frontal assault on the dominant political–economic paradigm of 
the United States, on its widespread faith in technological progress, markets, and 
economic growth, would likely be dismissed in public discourse. Thus, the CTBC 
showed that producers taking back their products fit with widely shared American values. 
One tactic has been to discuss EPR as facilitating recycling, which is far more popular 
than reusing or reducing materials in America’s high-consumption society. At the same 
time, it has been essential to distinguish real EPR from “bottle-bill type” recycling, which 
has no impact on greening product design, and to explain why EPR is a more effective 
and comprehensive approach. Another strategy has been to emphasize economic 
incentives, such as the promise of taxpayer relief and reduced disposal costs to high-
volume institutional purchasers. After the EU directives passed, the CTBC appealed to 
national interests by noting that U.S. companies were demanding lower environmental 
standards at home than they would have to follow in Europe and thus were offering U.S. 
taxpayers and consumers second-class treatment.   
The CTBC pointed to the health risks of improper handling of e-waste and was 
most successful when linking these risks with concerns about globalization. Activists first 
put the problem on the public radar most emphatically with the milestone report and 
video, Exporting Harm (Basel Action Network [BAN] et al. 2002), which exposed U.S. 
e-waste exports to Asia and the toll on its environment and people (see Puckett, this 
volume).  
In addition, like a lighter judo opponent grappling with a heavier foe, the CTBC 
used the weight of dominant business rhetoric to take down the industry’s own 
arguments. The campaign showed that producer responsibility, far from being the kind of 
“command and control” regulation lambasted by U.S. industry in the past, simply 
internalizes previously externalized costs of pollution, offers electronics companies 
flexibility to innovate in how they meet its targets for recycling and chemical phase-outs, 
and encourages them to compete on grounds of design and recycling efficiency.   
One of the most challenging issues for the CTBC to frame has been some 
recyclers’ use of cheap prison labor, which undercuts other recyclers’ ability to pay 
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employees a living wage and effectively evades workplace safety regulations, which are 
loosely enforced behind prison walls. The rise of a ferocious law-and-order mentality in 
the past decade—fed by the growing political power of prison-related industries and 
prison guards’ unions, the news media’s obsession with sensationalized crime coverage, 
and opportunistic “tough on crime” politicians—means there is little sympathy for 
inmates in America, which now imprisons a larger percentage of its population than any 
other democracy in the world. In 2003, activists began to take on the issue, carefully 
framing the problem in a report entitled A Tale of Two Systems that contrasted Dell’s use 
of prison labor to recycle its computers with a H-P recycling facility that did not use 
prisoners (SVTC and CTBC 2003; see Wood and Schneider, this volume).   
Moral Drama 
Successful environmental frames typically present problems as morally charged 
social dramas, as clashes of values embodied in clearly identifiable victims, villains, and 
heroes. Journalism prizes are not awarded for uncovering tales of moral ambiguity, and 
political leaders cannot advance legislation by ruminating on an issue’s ethical 
complexity. To reach both targets, activists needed to clarify the values at stake in the 
EPR debate. This progress is evident in activists’ use of images, which crystallized the 
CTBC’s messages in particularly memorable ways. Early efforts, such as a 1999 SVTC 
report entitled Just Say No to E-waste featured mounds of junked computers in city 
dumps awaiting disposal (see Photo 22.2<Photo 22.2>). These pictures symbolized the 
impending wave of electronics that would hit the waste stream in coming years, 
dramatizing the problem of producers’ commitment to rapid obsolescence and the 
government’s inability to handle the resulting surge of waste. But these images could not 
represent the sharp sting of injustice perpetrated by one entity against another. Three 
years later, the Exporting Harm report and video captured wide media attention in part 
because it added human figures to the stage. By revealing to Americans where much of 
their information-age garbage was going, the report brought home the painful truth that 
the industry’s toxic products and U.S. policies that encouraged hazardous waste dumping 
on the world’s poor were destroying communities and lives (see Puckett, this volume).   
Like investigative reporters, the CTBC relied on irony to command public 
attention and dramatize the need for producer responsibility. Exporting Harm, as many 
journalists noted, struck a chord because it revealed that much of the equipment delivered 
to U.S. recyclers was in fact exported overseas. Thus, responsible Americans who made 
the extra effort to bring their old computers to a recycling center were in fact the ironic 
victims of a sham perpetrated by some recyclers. Even the term “e-waste,” popularized 
by U.S. activists and adopted widely in the media, reversed the public perception of 
Internet-age progress in all things by suggesting the environmental and health 
consequences of the throwaway tools of e-mail and e-commerce.   
At the same time, the CTBC’s framing of the issues needed to show that not all 
producers or recyclers were equally guilty. Allying with more responsible industry actors 
was crucial to gaining support for a strong take-back system. There had to be heroes, or at 
least models, to show that EPR was feasible. For example, the CTBC followed the 
Exporting Harm report by releasing an electronics recyclers’ pledge of stewardship 
(Appendix E, this volume), in which numerous private recycling firms agreed to 
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renounce exporting and dumping e-waste and the use of prison labor. The campaign’s 
report on prison labor in recycling prompted Dell to stop its reliance on inefficient and 
unsafe facilities at federal penitentiaries by contrasting it with a state-of-the-art H-P 
recycling operation: 
These recycling operations suggest two paths for the future of e-waste 
recycling in America. One path leads toward efficient, transparent, modern 
facilities staffed by free labor, possessed of their rights as contemporary 
employees, able to protect themselves and nearby communities from 
harm. The other path descends into a closed, Dickensian world of 
prisoners condemned to dangerous work for little pay under backward 
conditions. Depending on the path we choose, e-waste recycling can 
contribute to community economic development and environmental 
protection, or can become the equivalent of breaking rocks on a high-tech 
chain gang. (SVTC and CTBC 2003, 5) 
Urgency and Visibility 
Environmental claims must demonstrate a threat’s impact on the present or near 
future. Oil spills, where immediate effects are dramatized, command public attention 
more powerfully than the seepage of radon gas into homes, which is a long-term and 
invisible problem. Activists emphasized the problem’s urgency by estimating the health 
and financial costs of handling e-waste over the coming five years. As states faced 
mounting budget deficits during the recession and stock market bust of 2000–02, the 
CTBC argued that states must pass take-back legislation because they could no longer 
afford to subsidize a wasteful industry.  
Agenda for Action 
Finally, environmental arguments must include a clear plan of action, including 
short-term measures that can provide tangible benefits, such as shutting down a polluting 
facility or cleaning up a fouled stream. The EU directives offered the CTBC a model 
long-term solution to the problem of e-waste and enabled the CTBC to pursue a proactive 
strategy rather than a reactive strategy. In the near term, the campaign developed clear 
steps for its major constituencies and tools for achieving them. It provided government 
with model local resolutions and state legislation, as well as with information on costs of 
e-waste and implementation of EPR policies, counterarguments to resistant industry 
actors, and public support. For activists, the CTBC produced CD-ROM and World Wide 
Web-based toolkits with numerous ideas for actions (see Wood and Schneider, this 
volume). For recyclers, the CTBC offered positive publicity from signing the pledge of 
stewardship and supporting EPR legislation. Soon the recyclers were rewarded when e-
Bay agreed to launch a reuse and recycling initiative on its Web site that recommended 
these recyclers to e-Bay users.  For the public, the campaign provided its annual 
environmental report card on electronics companies to help guide purchasing decisions, 
as well as information on how and where to recycle e-waste responsibly. For the health 
care industry’s institutional purchasers, the CTBC worked with its affiliate Health Care 
Without Harm to define clear procurement guidelines for adoption by hospitals 
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throughout the country.  The CTBC also worked with government allies to incorporate its 
“green purchasing” criteria in a US$4 billion request for proposals for information 
technology purchasing on behalf of governments, issued by the Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  Similar green procurement initiatives focused on college and 
university electronics purchasing.  
 The Future of EPR in the United States 
Producer responsibility for electronics has made impressive inroads in the United 
States since the late 1990s. The industry has conceded, in the words of an invitation to a 
recent AEA forum on regulation, that “it is clear that European environmental policy is 
setting a pattern for the rest of the world” (AEA 2003b). Some of the leading producers 
have accepted that they will have to incorporate the cost of handling their products at the 
end of their useful lives into the prices they charge U.S. consumers.   
Future advances in adopting EPR in the United States will depend on four factors. 
First, progress will continue to depend on the success of the EU directives on waste and 
toxics reduction as they are implemented, as well as more recently adopted take-back 
laws across Asia. Whether take-back provisions will result in safe recycling jobs at 
livable wages is an open question that may be answered differently in various parts of the 
world. We also will have to monitor whether EPR is reducing the furious and wasteful 
pace of electronics production and consumption, so that the volume of the new waste 
produced does not outweigh increased recycling. If, for unforeseen reasons, the EU 
directives cannot sufficiently slow the industry’s merry-go-round business model of 
instant product obsolescence, legislation may need to create additional incentives for 
companies to transition to a new model. We need to think more about how reducing 
overall electronics consumption can become a way of evaluating EPR policies. 
Second, the advancement of EPR may continue to face threats from international 
trade policy. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), adopted by the 
United States in 2005, prohibited the federal government from adopting a host of 
preferences that have sometimes been written into procurement policies, including 
preferences for environmentally sustainable products.  Although only nineteen states 
agreed to be bound by CAFTA’s purchasing restrictions before it passed Congress, the 
trade agreement requires the federal government to try to persuade state and local 
governments to accept the treaty’s terms.  If the federal government pursues the matter 
aggressively, for example, by withholding federal money (such as highway funds) unless 
states comply with CAFTA, then state and local preferences for greener electronics will 
be vulnerable to challenge.  Similar restrictions on government procurement policies 
were discussed in the Doha round of WTO negotiations until 2004, when members finally 
agreed to drop them, but the passage of CAFTA may keep the issue alive in the future. If 
environmental purchasing policies continue to be declared a restraint of trade, the 
movement for EPR will lose an important lever for change. 
Third, EPR’s success will depend on the quality of state and national laws on e-
waste. Although legislation is mushrooming at the state level, future efforts to bring an 
effective version of producer responsibility to the United States will depend on whether 
regulators and legislators settle for a quick-fix waste-management solution— similar to 
the bottle-bill approach—or commit fully to an EPR system that forces the reinvention of 
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electronics by internalizing the costs of toxic materials and inefficient design in 
producers’ bottom lines.  
Fourth, the success of the long-term EPR campaign in the United States depends 
on the CTBC’s ability to attract more industry support through future efforts similar to 
the Dell campaign. By continuing to split the industry and then working with those 
companies that embrace EPR, the CTBC will be more likely to win over policy makers 
than if the industry presents a united front against EPR. By pointing out that some leading 
companies support the environmentally preferable solution to e-waste, the campaign must 
further isolate those who call for merely assessing a consumer fee on new equipment 
sold. EPR advocates will need to show that this approach confers an unfair competitive 
advantage on companies most responsible for historic e-waste (such as IBM and 
television producers) and will fail to relieve taxpayers by generating insufficient 
financing for recycling legacy waste.  
More specifically, model legislation in the United States, at the state or national 
level, will need to incorporate the following elements (see CTBC 2003): 
 A definition of “electronic equipment” broad enough to include historic waste 
(such as old televisions and computers and their peripherals) and any new gear 
that includes a circuit board, complex circuitry, signal processing, or 
electronics that contains one or more hazardous substances; 
 Requirements that brand owners and producers take financial responsibility 
for developing and operating a system for taking back products; 
 Performance goals and timetables that spur producer accountability and better 
product design; 
 A comprehensive scope that covers all manufacturers and brand owners, 
regardless of their sales channels or end users; 
 A system for collecting historic waste (equipment sold and discarded prior to 
passage of the law) financed according to producers’ current market shares, or 
their share of products returned at end-of-life,  or other fair methods of 
allocating costs across the industry; 
 Release of taxpayers from all liability for costs of collection, handling, 
transporting, storing, recycling or disposing of e-waste; 
 A ban on disposing of e-waste in landfills and incinerators, which risk severe 
environmental and health harms to the public; 
 Phase-outs of the most hazardous materials used in production, including but 
not limited to lead, mercury, polyvinyl chloride, and brominated flame 
retardants; 
 A requirement that all electronics containing hazardous materials carry labels 
disclosing the materials and safe disposal practices; 
 Verifiable performance standards for electronics recyclers, including reporting 
and penalties for violations, worker health and safety regulations, no use of 
prison labor, and no export of hazardous waste;  
 Procurement guidelines for public agencies’ information technology 
purchasing that give preferences to more environmentally benign equipment, 
and rule out equipment not in full compliance with the legislation; 
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 Effective means of enforcement, including requirements for periodic reporting 
by producers, public availability of such reports, and a multistakeholder 
advisory board to review compliance; and 
 A commitment to fostering local economic development and job creation 
through electronics recycling and increased re-use.   
Conclusion 
The arrival of EPR on U.S. shores as a policy solution to the e-waste crisis of the 
late 1990s was born of several developments. The EU provided model legislation and a 
way of thinking about producer responsibility as the larger solution to risks posed by 
electronics throughout their lifecycle. Because of the electronics industry’s extension into 
global markets, the European laws have generated pressure on brand-name producers to 
raise environmental standards for their products worldwide. However, in contrast to 
Europe, in the United States, NGOS’ advocacy has advanced EPR more than policy 
makers’ efforts, and EPR has proceeded through different channels: a market-based 
campaign and a policy effort that bubbled up from local governments. Finally, in a nation 
of decentralized governance and a media-saturated political culture, NGOs’ attention to 
framing EPR in the news and policy discourse has been especially important. The 
progress of EPR’s adoption in the United States will continue to rely on staving off 
efforts to use international trade policy to trump state laws, on the success or failure of 
EPR in Europe and Asia, on the comprehensiveness of state and national legislation, and 
on NGOs’ ability to attract industry support for EPR. 
